Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy by James Brown & Rory Medcalf
  
 
Fixing Australia’s 
incredible defence policy 
E x e c u t i v e  s u m m a r y  
Australia’s new government must make tough decisions in defence 
policy. Australia’s broad national interests and the challenging 
strategic environment in Indo-Pacific Asia make it essential to 
modernise the Australian Defence Force. The nation’s defence 
capabilities remain underfunded and its strategic edge in the region is 
eroding. The gap between the nation’s interests and capabilities is 
widening, and it is getting harder to meet the demands of the US 
alliance. 
 
Australia’s new government needs to restore focus and funding to 
defence. The government will need a first-principles review to identify 
the military strategy and force structure required to protect and 
advance the nation’s interests. It will need to increase funding or be 
prepared to make drastic cuts to defence capability, with full 
awareness of the risks. It must also think deeply about the role of the 
US alliance in Australia’s security, and take the initiative in shaping 
that alliance in Australia’s interests. 
 
James Brown 
Military Fellow 
Tel: +61 2 8238 9118 
jbrown@lowyinstitute.org 
 
Rory Medcalf 
Program Director 
International Security 
Tel: +61 2 8238 9130 
rmedcalf@lowyinstitute.org 
 
  
LOWY INSTITUTE FOR 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
31 Bligh Street 
Sydney NSW 2000 
Tel: +61 2 8238 9000 
Fax: +61 2 8238 9005 
www.lowyinstitute.org 
O c t o b e r  2 0 1 3  A N A L Y S I S  
The Lowy Institute for International Policy is an independent policy think tank.  Its mandate 
ranges across all the dimensions of international policy debate in Australia – economic, political 
and strategic – and it is not limited to a particular geographic region.  Its two core tasks are to: 
· produce distinctive research and fresh policy options for Australia’s international 
policy and to contribute to the wider international debate. 
· promote discussion of Australia’s role in the world by providing an accessible and 
high-quality forum for discussion of Australian international relations through 
debates, seminars, lectures, dialogues and conferences. 
Lowy Institute Analyses are short papers analysing recent international trends and events and 
their policy implications. 
The views expressed in this paper are entirely the author’s own and not those of the Lowy 
Institute for International Policy.
  
Page 3 
A n a l y s i s  
Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy 
It’s unlikely that many Australians spared a 
thought for defence issues at the polls on 7 
September 2013. Just over five per cent of 
voters rate defence as an important political 
issue.1 The 2013 election saw little pressure on 
either party to present detailed or even coherent 
defence policies.2 Yet Australia’s new Coalition 
government under Prime Minister Tony Abbott 
will need to make tough decisions that will 
have long-term effects on the nation’s security, 
power and influence in the world. Failure to do 
so will be a consequential choice in itself. The 
new government will need to take major steps 
to address the serious funding and structural 
problems in Australia’s defence policy. 
 
Just as Australia faces large economic 
challenges, so too are long-held assumptions 
about the nation’s security in flux. In Indo-
Pacific Asia, the rise of China is changing 
relations between major powers, resulting in 
greater competition and mistrust and raising 
the likelihood of confrontation, coercion, and 
perhaps even war. Australia’s military edge in 
its neighbourhood is slipping as military 
technologies change and countries with faster-
growing economies spend more on their armed 
forces. Australia’s alliance with the United 
States is being reshaped in ways that will place 
new burdens on Australia. And even after a 
decade of foreign deployments, Australia’s 
military will need to be ready for a wide range 
of new contingencies.  
 
Any further decline, or even continued 
stagnation, in Australian defence spending 
would imperil its ability to respond to these 
challenges. Australia’s defence budget has been 
shrinking as a proportion of government 
spending. As a proportion of overall national 
wealth, measured by gross domestic product, it 
is (at 1.6 per cent) close to its lowest level since 
the 1930s.3  
  
Both major political parties have agreed that 
Australia’s future military capabilities will 
include many elements of Force 2030, a 
modernised defence force to be constructed 
over the next two decades, outlined in the 
Rudd government’s 2009 Defence White Paper 
and largely endorsed in the Gillard 
government’s 2013 version. Yet real doubts 
remain that this aspirational force will ever be 
realised. At a time when security experts show 
a rare degree of unanimity on the alarming 
state of defence policy, it is not clear that 
political leaders are assigning it a high enough 
priority. This is most evident when looking at 
the state of Australia’s defence budget. The new 
government will need either to set out a 
credible plan to boost defence spending or 
begin serious cuts to capabilities and personnel. 
 
This Lowy Institute Analysis details some of the 
key defence policy decisions that Australia’s 
new government must make, notably in three 
areas: what it wants the Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) to be capable of doing; how it is 
going to pay for a force that can deliver such 
options; and what the future of the US alliance 
means for both of these issues. This is not 
intended to be an exhaustive study. 
Forthcoming Lowy Institute research will 
consider more detailed reform, force posture 
and strategic options for Australia’s defence. 
What this Analysis will underline is the clear 
disconnect between, on the one hand, the 
increasingly complex strategic environment 
Australia faces, and its broad strategic interests, 
and, on the other hand, the low priority both 
sides of politics accord to defence policy and 
funding.  
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Broad national interests 
 
Australia has broad national interests. It has 
one of the world’s largest zones of maritime 
jurisdiction. The country is located far from 
most of its friends and allies and is not a 
member of any closely aligned regional bloc. Its 
prosperity and security depend highly on 
seaborne commodity exports, secure sea lines 
of communication, global flows of trade, 
finance, information and people, a rules-based 
international order, stability among powerful 
nations in Asia and the strategic imperatives 
and choices of its powerful ally the United 
States. For all these reasons, Australia’s 
interests extend well beyond the immediate 
physical security of its citizens and the 
protection of its territory. An Australian 
government could choose to define its national 
security interests narrowly in order to justify 
reduced defence spending. But that would make 
Australia a very different country, one no 
longer capable of contributing to international 
coalitions or otherwise influencing its strategic 
environment. 
 
That strategic environment is also becoming 
more challenging. Australian interests now 
extend through much of the Indo-Pacific, and 
that broad region is entering a phase of 
geopolitical uncertainty and change.4 The rise 
of China, and to a lesser extent India, is 
unsettling the Asian strategic order. Economic 
and political dysfunction is worsening across a 
range of countries, and multiple interstate 
security tensions remain unresolved, including 
over maritime sovereignty. Nationalism, 
resource pressures, military modernisation and 
strategic mistrust are reinforcing each other in 
dangerous ways. The probability of armed 
conflict involving major powers in Asia remains 
small, but has become more thinkable than it 
was five years ago. For all of the upsides of 
economic growth, disruptive societal and 
technological change is making the behaviour 
of major countries in the region less 
predictable. This period of heightened risk and 
uncertainty will continue for many years, and 
could worsen.  
 
In all of this, the probability of an adversary 
attacking Australian interests or territory 
remains low. But it is not zero. If strategic 
circumstances changed further, it is conceivable 
that another country might attempt to 
constrain Australia’s choices or threaten its 
interests through force. Conflict between major 
powers in our region, even one that did not 
directly involve Australia, would have 
profound implications for Australian interests. 
Plausible scenarios include armed confrontation 
between China and Japan, the Philippines and 
Vietnam over maritime disputes, with the 
prospect of the United States being drawn into 
one or more of these conflicts. A security crisis 
or even conflict on the Korean Peninsula 
remains an ever-present prospect.  
 
Australia also faces an enduring range of 
security challenges in its nearer neighbourhood. 
Various South Pacific island states along with 
East Timor will remain prone to severe 
governance problems, resource and population 
pressures, natural disasters, and the effects of 
climate change. Piracy, illegal fishing and the 
smuggling of people, weapons and drugs will 
also need to be tackled. And the threat of 
terrorism has not gone away; it will pose a 
persistent threat to Australians. 
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Living on the defence edge 
 
For decades, Australian defence policy has 
assumed that the country had a strategic edge 
over other militaries in the region by virtue of 
its access to advanced defence technology and 
the 13th largest defence budget in the world. 
This is clearly starting to change. The 2013 
Defence White Paper concluded that ‘over the 
next three decades, Australia’s relative strategic 
weight will be challenged as the major Asian 
states continue to grow their economies and 
modernise their military forces.’5 Analysis by 
the Australian Treasury concludes: ‘If both we 
and other countries were to maintain military 
spending as a constant share of GDP, other 
countries’ higher growth rates would lead their 
military capability to grow more rapidly than 
our own.’6 
 
Although Australia still has a more professional 
military than its neighbours, some countries in 
the region are acquiring advanced fighters and 
submarines, and developing sophisticated 
reconnaissance systems. Technology is shifting 
the balance. Disruptive military innovation has 
seen the development of offensive capabilities 
that are relatively cheap to acquire and deploy. 
Maintaining a regional defence edge is now 
more difficult for Australia and the ADF will 
need to raise its levels of capability, or face a 
relative decline.7 
 
Australia’s military capability is also eroding in 
absolute terms. After a decade of foreign 
deployments, much of the ADF’s equipment is 
worn and requires replacing.8 The impact of the 
10.5 per cent budget cut levied by the Gillard 
government in 2012 is only now being 
understood. Maintenance, logistics, and 
training are underfunded. Some capabilities, 
such as tanks, have been effectively mothballed. 
Whilst the ADF looks largely the same, its 
preparedness has been affected with fewer 
platforms and capabilities at a level of readiness 
necessary to provide options for government. 
This is particularly risky for a small and 
already finely calibrated force. In 2012, the 
then defence secretary issued a stark warning: 
‘as things stand I don’t think we are structured 
or postured appropriately to meet our likely 
strategic circumstances in the future.’9  
 
The ADF may have already reached a point 
where short term savings measures have caused 
some military capabilities to decline below their 
regeneration point for expected conflict 
warning times. The army, for one, has already 
signalled that without further augmentation it 
will not be able to concurrently sustain separate 
brigade and battle group sized deployments, as 
mandated by government.10 The inefficient 
defence estate, paucity of naval engineering 
capability, and underdeveloped national 
defence infrastructure are also jeopardising 
current capability and future force 
modernisation plans. 
 
Defibrillating Force 2030 
 
In recent years both sides of politics have 
shared essentially the same vision for a future 
modernised ADF – Force 2030. Unveiled in the 
2009 Defence White Paper, and largely 
reaffirmed in the 2013 Defence White Paper, 
Force 2030 has been envisioned as ‘a stronger, 
more agile and harder-hitting defence force’ 
with the ‘necessary combat weight and reach to 
be able to operate with decisive effect against 
credible adversaries.’11 This force structure was 
largely seen to reflect concern about the power 
of a rising China, and anticipated the 
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acquisition of about 100 advanced ‘fifth-
generation’ strike aircraft, 12 submarines, and 
a large number of surface ships armed with 
land-attack cruise missiles. This vision of the 
ADF has been repeatedly resuscitated over the 
past four years, by both sides of politics as well 
as by much of the security establishment.  
 
Force 2030 has been estimated to cost up to 
$275 billion to build over the next two decades 
- requiring more than $146 billion in additional 
funding beyond anticipated annual defence 
budgets.12 Yet in the four years since Force 
2030 was announced, only $18 billion of 
funding has been committed to new defence 
capabilities. This is partly because the Defence 
Department has lacked the institutional 
capacity to process such a bow wave of 
spending. But, critically, it is also because under 
short-term political pressures the Rudd and 
Gillard governments began deferring much of 
their own plans to modernise the nation’s 
military, delaying or cutting more than $20 
billion in defence investment.13 Most security 
experts believe that Force 2030 is now 
unachievable – one estimates that in the next 
decade alone an additional $33 billion beyond 
current defence budget projections will be 
required to meet the capability aspirations of 
the 2013 Defence White Paper.14  
 
Part of the challenge is that each year the latest 
defence equipment becomes more complex and 
more expensive, so deferring modernisation to 
save money in the short-term makes it more 
costly in the end. The acquisition cost of 
modern defence equipment grows at 
approximately 4 per cent.15 Even if Australia 
were to increase defence funding in line with 
long-term GDP growth rates (calculated at 2.7 
per cent a year), for each year that the 
construction of Force 2030 continues to be 
deferred the scale of underfunding will be 
magnified.16  
 
In the 2013 election, the main defence 
‘promise’ made by both sides was to increase 
defence funding from 1.6 per cent to 2 per cent 
of GDP, presumably to fund the core 
capabilities of Force 2030. The Coalition 
promised to ‘cauterise the hemorrhage’ caused 
by Labor’s 2011-12 cuts, and then ‘return to 
the aspiration of 2 per cent of GDP and 3 per 
cent real growth in the Defence Budget.’17 Then 
opposition leader Tony Abbott subsequently 
promised that ‘defence spending will be 2 per 
cent of GDP’ within a decade.18 The then prime 
minister, Kevin Rudd, committed Labor to 
‘sustained defence expenditure at 2 per cent of 
GDP’, but without giving a timeframe.19  
 
Though Force 2030 has remained the vision for 
Australia’s future military force structure, 
deferral and underfunding is making it look 
more like a mirage. Neither side of politics has 
fundamentally revisited either the rationale for 
Force 2030’s force structure or its feasibility 
should increased defence funding not eventuate. 
 
Three steps to tackling tough defence choices  
 
This pattern of delay and denial is not a 
sustainable basis for the nation’s defence 
policy. Australia must face up to some tough 
defence choices. As our allies and partners are 
already learning, when it comes to defence you 
cannot have it all. New Zealand has accepted a 
smaller, value-for-money military structured 
around a joint amphibious task force. The 
United Kingdom and France have reduced their 
expeditionary forces and even begun sharing 
some capabilities. Canada is reconsidering large 
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purchases like the Joint Strike Fighter and 
trying to redefine its area of strategic interest. 
The US Quadrennial Defense Review next year 
is expected to be ‘radical and reformist’,20 and a 
just-completed US Strategic Choices and 
Management Review lays out an austere choice 
for defence planners – reduce military readiness 
or investment in new capabilities.21 
 
Yet in Australia few of these types of tough 
defence choices have been discussed, much less 
made. Few Australian politicians show a 
sustained interest in defence. There is presently 
no distinct school of defence thinking on either 
side of politics, unlike previously when Labor 
was associated with the ‘defence of Australia’ 
doctrine while the Coalition placed greater 
emphasis on expeditionary operations. Over 
the past six years of Labor government, only 
Kevin Rudd showed an active interest in 
shaping military strategy. Despite the release of 
a National Security Strategy and a Defence 
White Paper in 2013, neither former defence 
minister Stephen Smith nor prime minister Julia 
Gillard offered much by way of their views on 
the strategic purpose of the nation’s military. In 
the last parliament, the few occasions when 
defence was discussed were dominated by 
relatively trivial issues such as travel leave for 
soldiers, ministerial movements on the air force 
VIP fleet, the carbon footprint of the ADF, and 
the future of part-time military bands.22 Even 
debate on military involvement in Afghanistan 
was overly focused on platitudes and tactics. 
There has been a bipartisan lack of political 
focus on the priority decisions needed to build 
and maintain an effective military force.  
 
There also seems a reluctance to face up to the 
gathering weight of risks and expectations in 
the changing strategic picture, and the 
challenges of crafting a defence and strategic 
policy to match. Policy statements, public 
speeches, and published official assessments are 
optimistic or euphemistic about the region’s 
future, exuding confidence that the United 
States and China will manage their differences 
and that there will be warning time for major 
strategic change. Continued neglect of military 
strategy at a time of great change, uncertainty, 
and complexity in the regional and global 
geopolitical landscape amounts to a needless 
accumulation of risk. This is not only about 
hedging against the strategic risk of a 
breakdown in the peace. It is also about 
hedging against the political risk of being 
caught without options when national interests 
are at stake. 
 
Historically most Australian political leaders 
have only engaged on strategic military issues 
in reaction to a crisis or strategic shock. This 
neglect has often proved risky.  The 1999 East 
Timor experience of being caught with a 
defence force unprepared to deploy still 
resonates deeply. Then, prime minister John 
Howard and defence chiefs were able to use 
tactical fixes to ‘adapt rapidly and get it “right 
on the night”’ in what the current Chief of 
Army has called ‘a triumph of improvisation 
rather than professional mastery.’23 But in the 
years since, warfare has become more 
technologically complex, and more reliant on 
interoperable systems and weapons that take 
years to develop and master. During the 
Howard era Australia had a high degree of 
flexibility about when and what niche military 
contributions it could contribute to allied 
campaigns. Strategy was set in Washington, not 
Canberra. In an Asian century and with the US 
rebalance to Asia, Australia’s future possible 
military deployments alongside the United 
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States are more likely to be in its region and 
therefore will be more strategic. Australia’s 
military deployments with the United States 
will also be less discretionary than those of the 
last decade, in which Australia had great 
flexibility in choosing what forces to contribute 
and when. Under such circumstances, 
capability shortfalls within a hollowed defence 
force will be more apparent. Tactical fixes will 
no longer suffice. 
 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s views on defence 
policy are almost entirely unknown to the 
public, and appear largely unformed at this 
stage. Defence Minister David Johnston 
possesses deep knowledge of technical and 
personnel issues, but is only beginning to 
articulate views on strategic-level military 
issues, such as what the ADF and major assets 
like its new amphibious assault ships should be 
used for and why.24  
 
So what then should the new government focus 
on when it comes to defence policy? Our 
recommendations are threefold. First, before 
deciding on how much to spend on defence the 
new government should decide what it wants 
the ADF to be able to do in the decades ahead. 
This will help determine whether a substantial 
change of direction of force structure from 
Force 2030 is in order. Second, the new 
government should commit the additional 
funds necessary to chart a credible path 
towards Force 2030, or alternatively make the 
tough decisions to reduce the ADF’s force 
structure and capabilities to match what it is 
willing to spend. Third, some deep thinking on 
the future direction of the US alliance is 
required, including to shape America’s 
rebalance to Asia in ways that suit Australia’s 
interests. 
What should Australia’s military be able to do? 
 
Senior military leaders and defence civilians 
have privately made clear that more detailed 
military strategic guidance is needed from 
politicians. In the end, only political leaders can 
choose what military options will be required 
to pursue national policy goals. Rather than 
just discuss what major weapons systems the 
ADF should acquire, a more detailed discussion 
is needed at the political level of what 
contingencies those capabilities may actually be 
needed for. 
 
There are some reasons why politicians may be 
reticent to discuss military contingencies: to 
protect diplomatic relations; to preserve secrecy 
for national security; or because military 
professionals are better qualified than they are 
to formulate strategy. However, none of these 
stands up to scrutiny. There are ways of 
publicly formulating policy on the hypothetical 
use of force without causing undue diplomatic 
harm. Though secrecy about capabilities is 
understandable, secrecy about strategy must 
have limits in a democracy. And military 
professionals can only make effective 
contingency plans to the extent they have a 
clear sense of what the nation and its leaders 
might want them to achieve.  
 
The Abbott government has promised a new 
defence white paper. This would provide an 
opportunity to take stock of Australia’s 
national interests and the changing strategic 
environment, and on that basis formulate a 
new military strategic vision for what the ADF 
should be able to do. This ought to include a 
cool-headed and unprejudiced appraisal of the 
2009 and 2013 white papers and the classified 
work that supported their judgments. 
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A truly first-principles review is needed rather 
than a process that modestly adjusts inherited 
capability choices and endorses pre-decided 
constraints. The basic structure of the ADF has 
remained essentially unchanged since the 
Menzies era and should be critically assessed 
alongside the ongoing appropriateness of Force 
2030. What might now seem radical and 
imaginative options for the ADF, such as a 
step-change investment in unmanned systems, 
must be considered. The new white paper 
should incorporate thorough independent 
analysis, in a similar fashion to the US 
Quadrennial Defense Review, and conclusions 
should be publically justified against other 
alternatives. At the end of the defence white 
paper process, the political leadership should be 
able to clearly articulate what military options 
it expects the ADF to provide, and in what 
range of contingencies. Here are some credible 
scenarios where the government will need to 
consider its military options. 
 
Like most militaries the ADF needs to be able 
to respond to a range of contingencies, from 
major state-on-state conflict at one end of the 
spectrum, to limited policing or humanitarian 
missions at the other end. Short of a highly 
unlikely direct attack on Australian territory, 
the ADF’s most demanding missions are most 
likely to be those in support of its key ally, the 
United States. Given our history of fighting 
alongside one another, the convergence of our 
interests in upholding a stable and rules-based 
regional and global order, and the obligations 
of our alliance treaty, it is difficult to imagine 
an Australian government refusing to provide 
military support of some kind in response to an 
American request under a range of plausible 
scenarios of confrontation or conflict in our 
region.  
Though the chance of war between the United 
States and China will continue to be small, it 
would have an extremely high impact on 
Australian interests even if Australia were not 
directly involved. Recent maritime tensions 
between China and other Asian countries, 
notably Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, 
have the potential to escalate. There would be 
particular pressure on the United States to 
assist its allies, Japan or the Philippines, should 
this occur. Many conceivable crisis scenarios in 
Asia involve coercion being brought to bear on 
a US partner or ally, leading to one of three 
outcomes: the coercion is not resisted, in which 
case a troubling precedent is set in the regional 
order; the United States supports its partner or 
ally, leading to an armed confrontation or face-
off that is managed without war; or there is 
escalation to war. All such outcomes would 
have implications for Australian interests, and 
in the second or third possibilities the United 
States would almost certainly seek Australian 
support, such as through the provision of a 
naval taskforce including submarines and 
major surface combatants.  
  
Not all the high-intensity conflict scenarios in 
Asia would directly involve China as an 
adversary. A crisis in North Korea could 
generate US expectations of an Australian 
military contribution, and not only because 
Australia is party to the UN Command in place 
since the 1950-53 war. There would also be 
specific roles for Australian combat troops 
(particularly Special Forces) to help US and 
South Korean forces secure North Korea and 
its nuclear weapons in the event of a regime 
collapse. 
 
Below the level of major regional conflict, there 
is a high probability of Australia being called 
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on to lead humanitarian or stabilisation 
activities. Most such missions would be small. 
One exception would be the remote possibility 
of being asked to restore order in Papua New 
Guinea – something beyond the current 
capabilities of the ADF. The need for the ADF 
to undertake humanitarian, disaster relief and 
evacuation missions further from Australia’s 
region is also expanding as Australian nationals 
and corporate interests increase their presence 
across the world. Allies, partners and the 
Australian public will expect the ADF to 
continue playing a role in the fight against 
terrorism, even after the deployment to 
Afghanistan ends. Australia might also be 
called on to provide forces to distant US-led 
stabilisation operations, including in the 
Middle East or Africa.  
 
Restore defence funding or make drastic cuts  
 
The government must set out a credible and 
detailed long-term defence budget plan that 
commits the additional funds necessary to fund 
Force 2030 or its revised force structure. There 
are several problems with the government’s 
current defence-spending aspiration of 2 per 
cent of GDP, beyond the fact that it may be 
deferred until the end of the decade. 
 
For a start, it may not be enough to restore the 
funding trajectory for Force 2030. It does not 
account for the impact of the past four years’ 
delay in funding defence acquisitions. Second, 
just because 2 per cent of GDP has historically 
been European NATO’s aspirational spending 
target, this does not mean that Australia’s 
alliance ‘dues’ should be the same. Australia’s 
strategic circumstances are entirely different 
from those of European NATO countries. 
Australia lacks the strategic depth provided by 
proximate allies with advanced militaries. 
Moreover, the findings of a new defence white 
paper process or increasing demands for 
alliance burden-sharing may mean that the cost 
of a credible ADF would be higher than 2 per 
cent of GDP.  
 
Even assuming that an increase to 2 per cent of 
GDP provides sufficient funding to fix defence, 
finding this money will be challenging for the 
Abbott government. Defence’s share of 
government outlays has shrunk from 5.8 per 
cent to 4.9 per cent over the past five years.25 
Across most portfolios, government spending 
increases over the past decade have outstripped 
GDP growth, but in defence the opposite has 
been true.26 This trend is set to continue in the 
next decade – rising health costs alone are 
forecast to account for an additional 2 per cent 
of GDP by 2023.27 Increasing funding for 
defence will conflict with the Abbott 
government’s stated intention of restoring the 
federal budget to surplus, and other expensive 
new schemes such as paid parental leave. The 
Defence Minister will find it difficult to secure 
increased funding. 
 
If the government is not really willing to 
increase defence funding, or cannot begin doing 
so soon, then it must start contemplating 
deliberate capability cuts in order to avoid the 
ADF becoming a hollow and, in the worst sense 
of the word, incredible force. As the United 
States has learned through sequestration, 
capability cuts that seem unthinkable can fast 
become a reality. It is better to minimise the 
damage by thinking ahead and identifying 
worst-case cuts according to a strategic and 
political logic than to have them occur in an 
abrupt and arbitrary way when the gap 
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between budget and ambition becomes 
impossible to paper over. 
 
If funding for defence remains less than 2 per 
cent of GDP, significant cuts will need to be 
made to ADF capability.  The following 
examples are intended principally to illustrate 
the scale of the cuts that would be necessary. 
The cost figures and calculations below are 
necessarily rough and should be taken as 
indicative of the scale of savings only. We are 
not recommending that these cuts should be 
made, but we list them to highlight the strategic 
and political risks that would accompany 
reduced funding of Australia’s defence 
capability:  
 
 Freeze the salaries of civilian and military 
staff for one year: This could save more 
than $2.5 billion over the next decade, but 
it would undoubtedly be politically sensitive 
to freeze the salaries of serving military 
personnel, some of whom may have only 
recently returned from duty in 
Afghanistan.28 
 Cut back on the ‘hardened army’: The 
Army’s planned fleet of new armoured 
vehicles is estimated to cost in the range of 
$10-16 billion.29 A 25 per cent reduction to 
the future armoured vehicle purchase could 
save about $3 billion over the life of the 
project, but would mean fewer armoured 
vehicles for deployed troops, exposing them 
to greater risk.30  
 Reduce fighter aircraft and flying hours: 
Australia plans to purchase at least 72 Joint 
Strike Fighters (JSF) to complement 24 
Super Hornets and 12 ‘Growler’ electronic 
warfare aircraft. Australia could reduce the 
readiness of existing fighter squadrons and 
purchase one fewer JSF squadron, bringing 
the JSF purchase down to just 48 planes. 
This would be out of step with regional 
trends (China for example is increasing 
fighter readiness and numbers), but could 
save somewhere between $3 and $4 
billion.31  
 Shrink the Defence Materiel Organisation 
(DMO): DMO has 7440 staff, three times 
more than the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and larger than 
both the Australian Federal Police and 
Customs.32 Reducing DMO personnel by 13 
per cent could save about $1 billion over the 
next decade, with a corresponding impact 
on the organisation’s procurement and 
sustainment functions. Fundamentally 
cutting back the role and structure of DMO 
so that personnel numbers could be halved 
would save about $4 billion over the same 
period.33 
 Buy fewer submarines: Australia has 
committed to modernising and doubling its 
submarine fleet at a cost that is currently 
unknown, but has been estimated at $36 
billion. The government could decide to 
build fewer submarines, for example eight, 
potentially yielding long-term savings in the 
vicinity of $9 billion.34 This would mean 
giving up the strategic weight that a larger 
submarine force would provide, and 
shouldering less of the alliance burden of 
submarine and anti-submarine operations. 
 
Any of these cost saving options would be 
politically difficult, and could seriously add risk 
to Australian interests – and even lives – in 
future security contingencies. There would be 
material consequences for Australia’s ability to 
carry its alliance burden and thus influence 
alliance strategy. But these options at least 
demonstrate the scale of the challenge facing a 
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government unable to fund existing defence 
modernisation plans, let alone recurrent 
defence spending at 2 per cent of GDP. The 
government would need to implement all of 
these policy measures in order to make up only 
a portion of the long-term shortfall in defence 
funding, which may be as high as $33 billion in 
the next decade alone.  
 
If the government were to make these sorts of 
cost savings in defence, it would need to re-
evaluate the mission set of the ADF. For 
instance, instead of being prepared to lead any 
stabilisation of South West Pacific states, the 
ADF might only be able to contribute elements 
to such tasks. Rather than maintaining 
maritime surveillance in the Eastern Indian 
Ocean, South Pacific, and the South China Sea, 
Australia might have to choose just one of these 
areas in which to operate. Australia might want 
to ease off on its defence diplomacy so as to 
reduce the expectations of what we can do for 
friends and partners such as Japan. Canberra 
would need to decline most future requests to 
join peacekeeping or stabilisation operations 
beyond the near neighbourhood. Above all, 
Australia would need to reset the expectations 
of its ally, the United States. 
 
Time to think hard about the US alliance – and 
take the initiative 
 
Even if it wants to be ambitious in its defence 
policy and strategic goals, the new government 
will need to think deeply about the US alliance. 
The US alliance remains critically important to 
Australia’s security, given that Australia cannot 
protect and advance its expansive interests 
single-handedly. Yet a defence policy that relies 
single-mindedly on what the alliance can do for 
Australia is unsustainable. A strengthened 
alliance and good regional defence relations are 
complements, not substitutes, for ensuring that 
Australia possesses strategic weight of its own.  
 
If Australia appears less than serious about its 
own security, or about shouldering a portion of 
the security burden in a changing Asia, it will 
be difficult to maintain credibility in the eyes of 
the United States, itself struggling to follow 
through on its declared ‘rebalance’ to Asia. 
Conversely, the differences within Washington 
over the future of its Asia strategy – what it is 
for, how it will be resourced, what is the right 
mix of military, economic and diplomatic levers 
– offers an opportunity for a smart ally to play 
a disproportionate role in shaping the 
rebalance. 
 
There is no doubt that the alliance brings great 
benefits to Australia, including high-level access 
to strategic deliberations, exceptional 
intelligence sharing, access to advanced military 
technology and a set of explicit and implicit 
security guarantees. These have long reduced 
the incentive to build what would be an 
enormously costly military deterrent 
commensurate with the size of our territory or 
the security challenges of our region.  
 
But transformative strategic change in Asia will 
reshape the alliance, whether we like it or not. 
So in tandem with reinvigorating Australia’s 
own defence strategy, and increasing funding, 
the new government needs to take the initiative 
to shape the alliance. It is better to ensure the 
alliance is adaptable and politically robust now, 
when it is not under strain, than to test its 
resilience in the thick of some future crisis.35 
 
Some changing dynamics in the alliance need to 
be closely examined and understood by the 
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Abbott government. One is deepening military 
integration, which the past few Australian 
governments have pushed a long way without 
much prior parliamentary or public discussion. 
Serving Australian officers and civilians have 
recently been appointed to senior positions 
within US Pacific Command and US Central 
Command. A US Marine Air Ground Task 
Force is establishing a forward presence in 
Darwin. US combat aircraft may well soon 
stage from Australia’s northern airfields, and a 
US space-tracking radar is due to be positioned 
in Western Australia. Other initiatives have 
been floated, including enhanced US naval 
access to Australian ports as well as 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
cooperation from Australia’s Indian Ocean 
territories. 
 
It might be tempting for a cash-strapped 
Australian government to volunteer further 
strategic real estate as its main contribution to 
the alliance.  But a greater US forward presence 
in Australia is predicated, more than any time 
in the past 50 years, on a credible ADF, able to 
protect and fund defence facilities on its 
sovereign territory. It is not clear who would 
pay for the infrastructure US and Australian 
forces would need as a result of the rebalance 
to Asia, such as improved airfields in northern 
Australia or on the Cocos Islands. In the 
aftermath of sequestration, it is hard to imagine 
the US Congress releasing major funds to make 
up for an ally’s unwillingness to provide 
infrastructure for the enhanced US military 
presence that same ally wants.  
 
An expanded US military footprint in Australia 
would also bring its own strategic complexities 
requiring close political attention. This includes 
the possibility of US units staging future 
military action from Australia, as well as 
managing the sensitivities of Australia’s 
neighbours. On all of these fronts, policy 
should be driven by political leadership, rather 
than emerging from habitual discussions 
between officials or through the momentum of 
existing military connections and enthusiastic 
staff planning. 
 
Another dynamic relates to demands on 
Australia as a force contributor as the United 
States rebalances its military and diplomatic 
posture in Asia, and looks to recalibrate 
military burden-sharing with its allies. Australia 
has grown used to providing niche military 
capabilities and broad political support for US 
global military campaigns. That does not mean 
this is the only or the wisest way for Australia 
to approach its alliance commitments in its 
own region.  
 
There is much Australia can contribute to the 
US alliance beyond serving as a location for 
American military assets and providing moral 
or political support for US military operations. 
Australian contributions can and should 
include leadership on security contingencies in 
the South Pacific; major responsibility for 
shared situational awareness in the eastern 
Indian Ocean and the core Indo-Pacific zone of 
maritime Southeast Asia; undertaking tailored 
engagement with countries that the US military 
is legislatively prohibited from engaging deeply 
with (including China); and providing military 
intelligence, planning, and wise strategic 
counsel in the event of regional crises. But 
Australia’s effectiveness in all of these roles 
requires credible and properly funded military 
capabilities of our own, underpinned by clear 
thinking on our own strategic and diplomatic 
goals.  
  
Page 14 
A n a l y s i s  
Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy 
Facing up to the challenge 
 
Ultimately, the defence decisions the new 
government will need to make must connect 
with a vision of Australia’s future national 
interests. The country’s political leaders will 
need to level with the public about the strategic 
challenges and choices ahead, from the defence 
budget, to the alliance, to the strategic realities 
of the Asian Century. Political leaders will need 
to engage more deeply and proactively with 
military strategy to determine what military 
options Australia needs in the decades ahead.  
 
The context of Australian defence policy has 
changed. The tactical alliance contributions, 
guaranteed defence funding increases and 
reactive big-ticket capability purchases of the 
Howard era are no more. Gone, too, are the 
contradictions of the Rudd-Gillard era, a 
combination of brief strategic flourishes with 
prolonged political inattention, budget cuts and 
deferrals. The new government has a 
responsibility to set a new course. If Australia is 
to have strategic weight in a more challenging 
region, it must start facing up to risks and 
make difficult choices on defence policy now.  
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